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ADVANCED SALE OF SERVICE CAPACITIES: 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF PRICE SENSITIVITY ON PRICING 




Should service firms sell in advance?  Using a theoretical approach, we study the 
optimality of advanced sale of capacity for a monopolistic service firm and examine the 
impact of market price sensitivity on the optimal price and capacity allocations for 
advanced sale.  We show that, when firms undertake advanced sale, capacity utilization 
and profits are higher even though prices for sale in advance are discounted.  In 
addition, we show that optimal pricing and capacity allocations for advanced sale 
depend on the expected price sensitivity at the time of consumption.  When price 
sensitivity at the point of consumption is expected to be low (unchanged), it is optimal to 
allocate more (less) capacity for sale at time of consumption than in advance.  Although 
optimal price and capacity allocations in advanced sale result in excess capacity, we 
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ADVANCED SALE OF SERVICE CAPACITIES: 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF PRICE SENSITIVITY ON PRICING 




In 1991, when there was a slump in the hotel industry, Marriott Corp. offered non-
refundable discounted room rates for customers who are willing to purchase in advance.  
This resulted in the firm selling in advance 250,000 non-refundable room nights, which 
was twice that expected (Weissenstein, 1991).  However, this practice did not catch on 
in the US, as the industry in general took a negative view of it. 
More recently, with a drastic drop in tourism due to the economic crisis, the 
practice of advanced sale has resurfaced in Asia.  In November 1998, Siam City Hotel 
Bangkok held an auction to sell off blocks of room nights available for the rest of 1998.  It 
succeeded in selling 1,400 room nights at an average price of 700 baht per room, which 
was much lower than standard quoted rates at that time (Hambi, 1998).  In a similar 
move, Sheraton Towers in Kuala Lumpur sold blocks of 1999 room nights in November 
1998 to major corporations in Kuala Lumpur, at a much discounted rate.  The practice of 
advance selling is not restricted to the hotel industry, it is also known to be done in 
industries like the airline and the car rental industries. 
These industry cases of advanced sale raise several issues.  Given that not all in 
the industry have a positive view of the advanced sale of capacity at a discounted rate, it 
is uncertain if such a practice is in fact optimal.  Although studies have suggested that 
advance sales can be a profitable yield management practice (Nagle and Holden, 1995), 
little formal research has been performed to examine the optimality of advance sales.  In 
addition, given that the occurrence of these practices coincides with an economic down 
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turn, it raises a strong possibility that demand conditions affect the practice of advance 
sales.  However, it is not clear how demand conditions impact advanced sale, in terms of 
optimal pricing and capacity allocations.  In this paper, we therefore attempt to resolve 
some of these issues to gain some insights into the practice of advanced sale.  
It is acknowledged in the academic literature that the characteristics of services, 
in terms of their perishability and inseparability, require the management of demand and 
supply such that they match at any given point in time.  This is because unused service 
capacities cannot be inventoried, nor can they be readily altered in advance.  One way 
that service firms can achieve such a demand-supply match, is to sell in advance their 
service capacities.  However, despite the practice of advanced sale of capacities by 
industry, theoretical research on advance selling is scant.  As such, issues about the 
optimality of advanced sale of service capacities, and optimal pricing and capacity 
allocation of advance sales, have not been formally investigated. 
This paper examines the optimality of advanced sale of service capacities from 
an economic perspective.  We present a game theoretic model of advanced sale of 
service capacities, for the case of a service firm commanding a monopolistic position.  
This means that the firm has some degree of market power as a result of a its 
differentiation efforts, at least in the short term (Chamberlin, 1933).  Service firms 
achieve a monopolistic position through appropriate positioning and differentiation 
strategies to build brand equity, and implementing promotions strategy like customer 
loyalty programs, all of which increase customer switching costs (Reichheld, 1996).  
Hence, in practice, it is not unusual that service firms can command monopolistic 
positions even though they are not the only service providers in the market. 
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In our model, the firm determines the optimal prices and capacities for advanced 
sale, and for the day of consumption.  To examine how demand characteristics affect 
advanced sale of capacities, we incorporate price sensitivity in our model formulation, 
and investigate its impact on a firm's optimal pricing of, and capacity allocation for, 
advanced sale. 
We show that, with advanced sale, capacity utilization and profits are higher than 
when advance sales is not undertaken.  However, profit maximization necessitates that 
firms tolerate excess capacity.  This is because the profit maximizing price level need 
not be the same as that which maximizes sales of capacity.  In fact we show that having 
excess capacity is a dominant strategy in terms of profit maximization, across the 
varying price sensitivity conditions examined.  In addition, we show that, when price 
sensitivity at the point of consumption is low, it is optimal to allocate more capacity at the 
time of consumption and less for advanced sale.  Doing so also results in better capacity 
utilization. 
However, a counter intuitive result is that, although profits are greater, the 
optimal prices for advanced sale and at the time of consumption are lower, when price 
sensitivity at the point of consumption is low, than when price sensitivity is high.  It is 
also rather surprising that the optimal price discount for advanced sale is higher when 
price sensitivity at the time of consumption is low.  These suggest that firms should 
capitalize on the opportunity to increase capacity utilization when price sensitivity is low, 
even if it means a lowering of prices. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
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What induces firms to sell their service in advance?  Several inferences can be 
made based on industry practices.  In the case of Eurotunnel (the operator of the 
Channel Tunnel), advance selling is done for cash flow reasons, to maximize cash 
revenues so as to ease the burden of paying interests on huge loans (Anon, 1994).  In 
the TV syndication industry, lower ratings that resulted from an oversupply of 
action/adventure cartoons, prompted TV syndicates to advance sell in order to preempt 
competition, for an alternative softer animated series in 1987.  In the trade show 
industry, advanced sale is conducted to ease planning, and for efficiency reasons 
(Pridmore, 1987).  For the same reason, advanced sale (or “upfront” selling, as it is 
termed in the industry) is also undertaken in the advertising industry.  For example, by 
advanced selling, the early monetary commitments by advertisers allows TV networks to 
plan their promotions budget based on committed revenues, to ensure that their shows 
achieve the promised ratings (Walley, 1990).  However, despite the practice in some 
industries to advance sell, the optimality of undertaking advanced sale is not 
unequivocal among industry members. 
Current literature suggests that perishability may be a reason that service firms 
practice advanced sale of capacities.  Unused capacity after the point of 
consumption/production has no salvage value.  Thus, the perishable nature of services 
"drives service firms toward a greater urgency to maximize sales forward" (Ng, Wirtz and 
Lee, 1999). 
In addition, it has been suggested that price discrimination over time may be a 
driving force for advanced sale (Png, 1991).  This is plausible because, the uncertainty 
of service availability at the point of consumption may make a segment of consumers, 
who are more risk averse, to purchase in advance as an insurance against uncertainty 
 
 
Lee, Khai S. and Ng, Irene C.L. (2001), “Advanced Sale of Service Capacities: A Theoretical Analysis of The Impact of 
Price Sensitivity on Pricing and Capacity Allocations” Journal of Business Research, 2001, Vol. 54, pp219-225 
 
6 
(Png, 1989).  Knowing this, firms can then maximize their profits by selling in advance, 
charging a price premium for advanced sale, and discounting their prices for remaining 
capacities as the consumption date approaches (Png, 1991).  However, this does not 
explain the practice of price discounting in advanced sale. 
With the exception of Png’s studies (1989, 1991), there is little theoretical 
research being conducted on the topic of advanced sale.  Like Png, we examine the 
optimality of advanced sale of service capacities from an economic perspective.  
Similarly also, we adopted a theoretical approach to examine advanced sale of service 
capacities for the case of a service firm commanding a monopolistic position. 
Other than the similarities described, our model differs from that of Png’s in 
significant ways.  In our model, we examine both pricing and capacity allocation for 
advanced sale.  To do this, we structure our formulation based on a Cournot type 
response function, in which the firm chooses capacity allocations for sale in advance vis-
à-vis at time of consumption.  In addition, price sensitivity is incorporated in our model, 
which allows us to examine its impact on the firm's decision on pricing and capacity 
allocations.  Finally, Png (1991) assumes demand outstrips capacity, hence the issue of 
excess capacity does not arise.  In contrast, we do not place such a restriction on 
demand, as we are also interested in examining the impact of advanced sale on capacity 
utilization.  
The issue of advanced sale of capacities differs from that of price discrimination 
to influence demand such that a demand-supply match is achieved (e.g. the use of peak 
load pricing), which has been well discussed in the literature (Nagle & Holden, 1995).  
The latter involves pricing at the point of consumption, whereas advanced sale involves 
pricing for purchases made in advance of consumption.  For example, a hotel room on 
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the Friday night of a long weekend is greatly sought after, compared to the same hotel 
room the day before.  This suggests a higher pricing for the room for Friday night, than 
other days.  However, in advanced sale, we address the issue of how to price the same 
room for a particular day (Friday, for example), for consumers who wish to purchase well 
in advance of that day.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We present our model formulation 
in §3.  In §4, the analyses are presented.  We first consider the case when the firm does 
not practice advanced sale (§4a), to provide a benchmark for comparison later.  This is 
followed by the case in §4b, in which the firm practices advanced sale of capacities.  
Finally, in §4c, we examine the impact of price sensitivity on pricing and capacity 
allocations, when the firm practices advanced sale.  §5 discusses our results, and the 
final section contains some concluding remarks with regards to managerial implications 
and directions for future research. 
 
3. MODEL 
Consider a service firm, for example a major hotel, which has achieved a 
monopolistic position as a result of its differentiation efforts, and has a total room 
capacity for any particular day of K.  Since capacity cannot be easily altered, we assume 
that the capacity K is a constant.  When deciding on advanced sale, the firm has to 
decide on the price and capacity to allocate for purchases made in advance.  Let t be the 
time to the consumption date, t0 (when t = 0) be the time of production/consumption, and 
tA (such that tA > t0 = 0) be the time of advanced sale.  At t0, the service is produced and 
consumed, and any unused capacity that arises has no salvage value after t0.  We 
assume that tA and t0 are exogenous. 
 
 
Lee, Khai S. and Ng, Irene C.L. (2001), “Advanced Sale of Service Capacities: A Theoretical Analysis of The Impact of 
Price Sensitivity on Pricing and Capacity Allocations” Journal of Business Research, 2001, Vol. 54, pp219-225 
 
8 
In practice, tA is industry specific.  For example, in the hotel and airline industries, 
firms are known to sell their capacities more than a year in advance in some markets 
(hence, tA is more than a year).  Whilst in the advertising industry, TV networks are 
known to sell their advertising spaces approximately 6 months in advance (hence, tA 
represents 6 months in advance).  Hence, tA is defined as the time in advance of the 
date of service consumption that clients are prepared to make a purchase commitment.  
This also includes all forms of advanced bookings and reservations for a service, which 
is binding. 
As service firms in general operate with high fixed costs, C, which is much higher 
than the variable cost of capacity, we consider the case when variable costs are 
sufficiently small to be ignored, for example airlines and hotel.  Let k0 and P0 be the 
capacity and price of a unit capacity, respectively, at the time of consumption t0.  
Similarly, let kA and PA be the capacity and price of a unit capacity, respectively, at the 
time of advanced sale tA.  Hence, the firm’s objective function can be defined as, 
Max.k π = Max.k [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C] 
Where, π represents the firm’s profits.  The objective function implies that at a 
time before tA, the firm chooses price and capacity allocation for t0 and tA, to maximize 
profits.  Let the total sales revenue due to the firm be R, where R = Pk. 
We assume that price is a linear decreasing function of total capacity available at 
any point of time t. 
P = α - β(k), where k = total capacity at time t 
Hence, at time tA, the response function becomes,  
PA = α - β(kA + k0)  (1) 
While at time t0, the response function is, 
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P0 = α - β(k0)   (2) 
Our use of a linear demand function is consistent with prior marketing research.  
The use of linear demand functions is extensive in theoretical research (eg. Jeuland and 
Shugan, 1983; Ingene and Parry, 1995), and in empirical studies (Lilien, Kotler and 
Moorthy, 1992).  This is because a linear demand function can be a reasonable 
approximation of a non-linear one, given that the latter can be defined as one that 
comprises a series of linear functions (f(x) = ∑i fi(x): xj ≤ x ≤ xk, i = 1 to n, j ≠ k) over an 
appropriately partitioned (xj ≤ x ≤ xk) non-linear one such that the range of each partition 
approaches zero (ie. (xk - xj) → 0).  The accuracy of a linear function as an 
approximation of a non-linear one thus depends on how the non-linear function is 
partitioned and the range of interest. 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
We will first analyse the case when the firm does not practice advanced sale, 
before considering the case when the firm practices advanced sale.  All proofs to the 
propositions are found in the appendix. 
 
(a) Profitability without Advanced Sale 
Without advance sales, the firm's objective function becomes, 
Max.k π = Max.k (P0k0 – C) 
Substituting equation (2) for the price function, into the firm’s objective function, 
and deriving the first order condition with respect to k0, we can solve for the optimal 
capacity allocation.  The solution being,  
k0 = k*  = α/2β 
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However, this assumes that an interior solution exist, that is k0 = k* ≤ K.  In which 
case, given that k*= k0 = α/2β, the optimal price and resulting profits would be,  
P0 = P* = α - β(k*) = α/2 
π = (P0k0 – C)  =  [(α2/4β) – C] 
This also results in the firm having an excess capacity,  
e = (K – k*) = (K - α/2β) > 0 
However, if k0 = k* > K, then k* = K, resulting in an excess capacity e = 0.  Under 
this situation, the optimal price and the resulting profits would be, P* = [α - β(K)] and π*  = 
[(α - βK)K – C], respectively. 
 
Proposition 1: Having excess capacity intentionally is profit maximizing. 
 
 The proposition is rather counter intuitive, as a common call in the service 
literature on capacity management calls for matching demand and supply, thus implying 
that excess capacity is unhealthy profit wise (Orsini and Karagozoglu, 1988; Sasser, 
1976; Shemwell & Cronin, 1994).  However, the proposition is intuitively plausible, as a 
low price level that maximises the sales of capacity causes a firm to lose out in profit 
margins.  The loss in profit margins can be sufficiently large, to the extent that a low 
price that maximises capacity utilisation may not be profit maximising.  Furthermore, if 
the variable cost of capacity is sufficiently low, then excess capacity does not pose as a 
substantial cost burden. 
 For the rest of this paper, we focus only on the case when an interior solution 
exists – that is k* ≤ K.  Otherwise, the results will be driven strictly by boundary 
conditions, and maximum achievable profits are not attained. 
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(b) Profitability with Advanced Sale 
If the firm chooses to sell in advance, its objective function is, 
π = [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C] 
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into the above, and deriving the first order 
condition with respect to kA and k0, we arrive at the optimal capacity allocations after 
solving the first order conditions simultaneously. 
k0  = k*  = α/3β 
kA  = k**  = α/3β 
e = (K - k* - k**) = (K - α/3β - α/3β) = (K - 2α/3β) 
Substituting k* and k** into equations (1) and (2), and rearranging, we can derive 
the optimal price levels, which are as follows. 
P0 = P* = 2α/3 
PA = P**= α/3 
 
Proposition 2a: Capacity utilisation is higher when advanced sale of capacity is 
undertaken, than when it is not, i.e. e(advanced sale) < e(no advanced sale). 
 
Proposition 2b: Advanced sale of capacity at a reduced price of PA = α/3 
supports an even higher price at time of consumption of P0 = 2PA = 2α/3, than 
when no advanced sale is undertaken (P0 = α/2).  
 
When no advanced sale is undertaken, then a larger amount of capacity 
available at the point of consumption (k0 = k* = α/2β) drives prices down.  However, with 
advanced sale, half the capacity is sold in advance (albeit at a lower price), resulting in 
less capacity being available at the time of consumption (k0 = k* = α/3β = kA = k**).  
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Hence, prices are driven up at the time of consumption.  The overall effect is that 
capacity utilisation is improved, and profits are increased, as Proposition 3 below shows. 
This perhaps provides an explanation for the practice of advance selling of TV 
advertising slots in the USA, as reported earlier.  TV networks typically sell 75%-80% of 
their season’s advertisement capacity months before the advertisements are aired.  The 
remaining capacity is held back for quarterly “scatter” markets, where prices are much 
higher because there is less capacity available to meet demand (Mandese, 1995). 
Substituting the above prices in the firm’s profit function, we obtain after some 
algebraic rearrangement, 
π = (α2/3β) – C 
 
Proposition 3a: A symmetric allocation of capacity across t0 and tA, k* = k** = 
(α/3β), is optimal. 
 
Proposition 3b: Advanced sale of capacity, even at a price discount, is more 
profitable than when no advance sale is undertaken: π((P0, k0), (PA, kA)) > π(P0, 
k0). 
 
Allocating half of a firm's capacity for sale in advance is optimal in terms of profit 
maximisation, and is more profitable than selling all the capacity at the time of 
consumption.  The result, that having advanced sales is more profitable than having no 
advance sales, is consistent with that obtained by Png (1991).  However, Png’s study 
does not address the issue of capacity allocation for advanced sale.  In addition, in Png’s 
analysis, advanced sale is carried out at a price premium.  In contrast, a price discount is 
optimal, in our analysis. 
Proposition 3 is consistent with the current industry practice of advanced sale of 
airline tickets in Asia.  Customers purchasing airline tickets in advance will find ready 
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availability of seats, and at a significantly reduced special fare - commonly termed APEX 
(Advance Purchase Excursion) fares.  However, passengers who purchase their tickets 
close to the departure date, will find to their dismay that seats are not readily available, 
even if they are prepared to pay a price premium.  
 
(c) Low Price Sensitivity Forecasted at t0 
Given that economic conditions can change over time, it will affect price 
sensitivity accordingly.  Hence, in this section, we shall investigate how a low (or a high) 
price sensitivity forecast can affect advanced sale.  When consumers have low price 
sensitivity at t0, then they are less sensitive to price variations in making their purchases 
at t0.  Hence, an additional unit of capacity allocated at t0 results in a smaller decrease in 
price at t0.  To incorporate changes in price sensitivity over time into our formulation, let 
the price sensitivity at t0 and tA be β0 and βA, respectively, such that,   
β0 ∈ {βL, βH} and 
βL < βA < βH 
The symbol βL represents a price sensitivity that is low, while the symbol βH 
represents a price sensitivity that is high, at t0.  Incorporating the differing price 
sensitivities into the firm’s objective function, we obtain,  
π = (α - βA(kA + k0))kA + (α - βL(k0))k0 - C 
By deriving the first order condition with respect to kA and k0, and solving the 
resulting equations simultaneously, the optimal capacity allocations are derived, which 
are,   
k0  = k*  = α/(4βL - βA) 
kA  = k**  = [α(2βL - βA)]/[(4βL - βA)βA] 
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Proposition 4a: When price sensitivity at t0 is expected to be low, more capacity 
is allocated for sale at time of consumption t0, and less capacity is allocated for 
advanced sale at tA, resulting in k*/k** > 1. 
 
Proposition 4b: When price sensitivity at t0 is expected to be low (β0 = βL  < βA), 
capacity utilisation is greater than that when (β0 = β  = βA), resulting in lower 
excess capacity, if βA > βL > (βA/4). 
 
A decrease in price sensitivity as the consumption date approaches can be due 
to imminent perishability of the service.  The fact that a service is perishable is double-
edged.  Neither a firm nor a customer can store capacity.  Hence, when consumers are 
uncertain about the value they place on the service till close to the time of consumption 
(Png, 1989), they may find themselves with less time to make purchases and less 
choices as well.  These translate into a lowering of price sensitivity being observed in the 
market, as the date of consumption approaches. 
In addition, a consumer who has not made any advanced booking for a hotel is 
likely to be less price sensitive when he/she requires a room at the time of consumption, 
than one who has made an advanced booking well ahead of the time of consumption.  
With regards to the hotel industry, it is a known fact that business travellers, who usually 
make their hotel bookings close to the time of consumption, are far less price sensitive 
than tourists, who usually make their hotel bookings far in advance. 
Given that price sensitivity is lower at the time of consumption, a firm can 
therefore capitalise on this by allocating a higher capacity at t0, and less at tA.  Doing so 
will also increase capacity utilisation, resulting in lower excess capacity. 
Substituting k* and k** into the price and the firm’s profit functions, we obtain, 
P0  = P*  = α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA) 
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PA  = P** = α(2βL - βA)]/(4βL - βA)  
π = {[α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA)][α/(4βL - βA)]} + {[α(2βL - βA)]/(4βL - 
βA)][α(2βL - βA)]/[(4βL - βA)βA]} – C 
⇒ π = [α2βL/((4βL - βA)βA)] – C 
 
Proposition 5a: The price levels (PA, P0), when price sensitivity at t0 is low (β0 = βL  
< βA), are lower than that when (β0 = β  = βA). 
 
Proposition 5b: When price sensitivity at t0 is low (β0 = βL  < βA), the price 
reduction (PA/P0) for advanced sale is greater than that when (β0 = β  = βA). 
 
Proposition 5c: When price sensitivity at t0 is low (β0 = βL  < βA), profitability is 
greater than that when (β0 = β  = βA), if βA > βL > (βA/4). 
 
A rather surprising result is that the optimal price levels for advance sales and at 
the time of consumption are reduced (Proposition 5a), when the market is forecasted to 
be less price sensitive at the time of consumption.  It is also counter intuitive that the 
optimal price discount for advanced sale is increased (Proposition 5b).  However, the 
resulting profits are greater than that when the price sensitivity is forecasted to be 
unchanged (Proposition 5c).  These results, together with Proposition 4, suggest that the 
firm should take advantage of the lower price sensitivity at the time of consumption to 
increase capacity utilisation, even if price levels are lowered and more discounts are 
given for advanced sale. 
For the case when the price sensitivity is forecasted to be higher at the time of 
consumption, the results are a reversal of that when the price sensitivity is forecasted to 
be lower (Appendix). 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
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Our study shows that advance selling of service capacities is optimal.  It is 
commonly believed that advance selling stems from demand uncertainty at time of 
consumption, or is motivated by competitive preemption.  Our findings show that even 
when these factors are absent, advance selling is optimal. 
Across all the cases analyzed, profit maximizing prices result in non-zero excess 
capacity.  This suggests that it is optimal to plan for excess capacity.  In fact, from 
Propositions 1, 2a, 3b, 4a, and 5c, it can be generalized that having excess capacity is a 
dominant strategy.  The corollary thus follows. 
 
Corollary 1: It is a dominant strategy to plan for, or to have, excess capacity. 
 
The corollary implies that, in the initially planning of capacity, a firm should 
intentionally plan for excess capacity.  This is to ensure that it does not miss out on the 
opportunity cost of lost sales, so that profits can be maximised.  Furthermore, given that 
fixed costs of operations way out weigh the variable cost of operations, service firms 
should focus on optimal pricing that maximises profits, rather that that maximises 
capacity utilisation. 
However, the notion of holding excess capacity appears to go against the grain 
of conventional wisdom held by the industry.  The common argument being that, selling 
the excess capacity even at a much lower price earns something at least, which is better 
than earning nothing if excess capacity is held.  This argument is valid only if service 
firms can successfully price discriminate across consumers at the time of consumption.  
Otherwise, the lower price for excess capacity drags down the profit maximising higher 
price.  Thus, to achieve price discrimination of consumers at the time of consumption, a 
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“waiting list” of consumers can be created to fill the excess capacity at the very last 
moment.  
 
Corollary 2: Service firms can price discriminate to maximise sales of excess 
capacity by creating a “waiting list” of consumers. 
 
  
Other plausible ways of achieving successful price discrimination at the time of 
consumption are suggested by Ng et al. (1999). 
It has been acknowledged that allocating fixed costs is a problem in service 
operations.  Some firms distribute fixed costs over its entire capacity, to account for unit 
capacity costs, in performing break-even analysis (Lovelock, 1991).  Doing so may lead 
to a sub-optimal price being charged, which is not profit maximising, as there is the 
danger that the unit price is being treated as substitute of unit variable cost in 
determining profit maximising prices.  Furthermore, by allocating fixed costs over the 
entire service capacity, firms may become reluctant to price low in advance.  Yet, if 
prices are not low in advance, a higher price at time of consumption cannot be 
supported.  Thus, service firms, which operates on high fixed cost and low variable cost, 
should be cautious about the allocation of fixed cost across capacity in their yield 
management practice. 
Our results show that capacity allocation for advance sales is dependent on price 
sensitivity.  Specifically, when price sensitivity is forecasted to be low (high), the capacity 
allocated for advanced sale decreases.  Hence, from Propositions 3a and 4a, the 
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Corollary 3: Service firms should increase (decrease) the capacity allocation for 
advanced sale if the forecast of the price sensitivity at the time of consumption is 
high (low).  
 
 Finally, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that when price sensitivity at the time of 
consumption is expected to be low, then service firms should increase their capacity at 
the time of consumption and (even) lower their prices to capitalise on the low price 
sensitivity.  The corollary thus follows. 
 
Corollary 4: Service firms should increase the capacity allocation and also lower 
their prices at the time of consumption if the forecast of the price sensitivity at 
that time is low. 
 
 Hence, although our work is theoretical in nature, there are several important 
decision rules that can be deduced (Corollaries 1 to 4) to guide managers in their 
decisions about the use of advanced sale. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
There are several directions for future research.  We formulated our model based 
on supply-side economics in using the Cournot type response function.  This is done in 
order to investigate the impact of price sensitivity on advanced sale.  A future research 
direction is to structure the model based on a Bertrand type response function.  Doing so 
would allow the examination of the impact of demand elasticity on optimal pricing and 
capacity allocation in advanced sale.  The results from the two perspectives can then be 
compared to gain greater insights in the practice of advanced sale.  Research in this 
direction is currently under progress. 
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We have excluded competition from our analysis.  We are currently working on 
an extended model to include competition, with the aim of investigating how competitive 
interactions will impact advanced sale.  It is for this reason also that, method wise, we 
adopted a game theory based approach to examine the practice of advanced sale in this 
paper.  We hope our paper will provide greater stimulus to researchers in service 
marketing to perform theoretical research based on deductive science, hence further 
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Proof of Proposition 1: π = (P0k0 – C) = [(α - βk0)k0 – C] ⇒ FOC (wrt k0): 0 = α - 2βk0 ⇒ 
k0 = k* = α/2β, if k0 = k* < K.  Hence, P0  = P* = α - β(k*) = α/2, e = (K – k*) = (K - 
α/2β) > 0, and π = (P0k0 – C)  =  [(α2/4β) – C].  If k0 = k* ≥ K, then k* = K ⇒ P* = α - β(K), 
e = 0, and π = (P0k0 – C) =  [(α - βK)K – C]. ⇒ Profit maximizing price results in excess 
capacity e > 0.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2a: π(without advance) = (P0k0 – C) = [(α - βk0)k0 – C] ⇒ FOC (wrt 
k0): 0 = α - 2βk0 ⇒ k0 = k*  = α/2β, P0  = P* = α - β(k*) = α/2, and e(without 
advance) = (K – k*) = (K - α/2β).  Hence, π(without advance) = (P0k0 – C) =  [(α2/4β) – C].  
On the other hand, π(with advance) = [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C] ⇒ π (with advance) = (α - β(kA 
+ k0))kA + (α - β(k0))k0 – C ⇒ FOC wrt kA: 0 = α - 2βkA - βk0.  FOC wrt k0: 0 = α - 2βk0 - 
βkA.  Solve simultaneously the two FOCs: k0 = k* = α/3β and kA = k** = α/3β ⇒ e(with 
advance) = (K - k* - k**) = (K - α/3β - α/3β) = (K - 2α/3β).  Hence, ewith advance = (K - 2α/3β) 
< ewithout advance = (K - α/2β).  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2b:  
Substituting k* and k** into equations (1) and (2), and rearranging, we can derive the 
optimal price levels, P0(with advance) = P* = 2α/3, and PA = P**= α/3.  Therefore when 
advanced sale is not undertaken, P0(without advance) = α/2 < P0(with advance) = 2α/3.  
QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3a: k* = k** = (α/3β) derived from first order condition of profit π w.r.t. 
capacity. QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3b:  
Since π(with advance) = [(PAkA  + P0k0) – C], PA=α/3, kA=α/3β, P0=2α/3 and k0=α/3β, ⇒ 
π = (α/3)(α/3β) + (2α/3)(α/3β) – C = (α2/3β) – C.  Hence, π(without advance) = [(α2/4β) – 
C] < π(with advance) = (α2/3β) – C.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4a: When β0 = βL  < βA, k* = [α/(4βL - βA)], and k** = [α(2βL - βA)]/[(4βL 
- βA)βA]. When β0 = β  = βA, k* = α/(3βA) = k**.  Hence, more capacity is allocated for sale 
at t0, as [α/(4βL - βA)] > α/(3βA), if (4βL - βA) < (3βA) ⇒ βL < βA, which is true.  Less 
capacity is allocated for sale at tA, as [α(2βL - βA)]/[(4βL - βA)βA] < α/(3βA), if 6βL - 3βA) < 
(4βL - βA) ⇒ βL < βA, which is true.  Hence, k*/k** = [α/(4βL - βA)] x [(4βL - βA)βA]/ [α(2βL - 
βA)] = βA/ (2βL - βA) > 1 if βA > (2βL - βA) ⇒ βA > βL.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4b: When β0 = β  = βA, e = [K - 2α/3βA].  When β0 = βL  < βA, e = [K - 
α/(4βL - βA) - α(2βL - βA)/(βA(4βL - βA))].  Hence, capacity utilization is greater when the 
price sensitivity at t0 is low as, [K - 2α/3βA] - [K - α/(4βL - βA) - α(2βL - βA)/(βA(4βL - βA))] > 
0 ⇒ βA > βL > (βA/4) (after rearranging the inequality). QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5a: When β0 = β  = βA, P0 = 2PA = 2α/3.  When β0 = βL  < βA, P0 = 
α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA), and PA = α(2βL - βA)]/(4βL - βA).  Hence, the price level at t0 is lower 
when price sensitivity at t0 is low as, α(3βL - βA)/(4βL - βA) < 2α/3, if (9βL - 3βA) < (8βL - 
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2βA) ⇒ true for βA > βL.  The price level at tA is also lower when price sensitivity at t0 is 
low as, α(2βL - βA)/(4βL - βA) < α/3, if (6βL - 3βA) < (4βL - βA) ⇒ true for βA > βL. QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5b: When β0 = β  = βA, P0 = 2PA = 2α/3, resulting in PA/P0 = ½ (or 
50% of P0).  When β0 = βL  < βA, PA/P0 = (2βL - βA)/(3βL - βA) < ½ if 2(2βL - βA) < (3βL - βA) 
⇒ (4βL - 2βA) < (3βL - βA) ⇒ βL < βA, which is true.  QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5c: When β0 = β  = βA, π = [(α2/3β) – C].  When β0 = βL  < βA, π = 
[[α2βL/((4βL - βA)βA)] – C].  Hence, {[[α2βL/((4βL - βA)βA)] – C] - [(α2/3β) – C]} > 0 ⇒ {(βA - 
βL)(4βL - βA)} > 0 (after rearranging the inequality), which implies that βA > βL > (βA/4). 
QED. 
 
Case - When Price Sensitivity is Forecasted to be High at t0: Proof that the results are a 
reversal of that when the price sensitivity is low at t, are available from the authors upon 
request.  
 
